A decision by the Singapore High Court to refuse an interim award illustrates what can happen when institutional arbitration rules outpace the law of the seat.
Chinese arbitral institutions have looked to adopt best practices found in other institutional rules, such as providing for emergency arbitrators to order interim relief. Yet China’s Arbitration Law does not provide for tribunals, let alone emergency arbitrators, to grant interim relief. The emergency arbitrator’s authority to act was tested in Zhejiang Crystal-Optech Co Ltd v Moveon Technologies Pte Ltd [2026] SGHC 186.
Can institutional rules give an arbitrator powers that he or she does not possess under the law of the seat? Could the parties grant an arbitrator powers not found in the law of the seat? These were some of the questions explored in the decision. The Singapore High Court ultimately refused to enforce an interim award issued by a CIETAC emergency arbitrator seated in China, holding that the emergency arbitrator had exercised a power it simply did not possess.
In response, CIETAC has defended the enforceability of its emergency arbitrator provisions and issued its own interpretation of its rules, but it will remain to be seen whether this addresses the limitations on arbitration in China created by China’s Arbitration Law.
While the decision in Zhejiang Crystal-Optech stemmed from the legal framework for an arbitration in China, it could have implications for arbitrations seated in other jurisdictions (like Indonesia) that do not permit tribunals expressly to order interim measures.
Finally, it should be noted that the Singapore High Court ruled in CVG v CVH [2023] 3 SLR 1559, that an interim award by a foreign emergency arbitrator is in principle enforceable in Singapore under the International Arbitration Act (IAA). Nothing in this decision changes that.
Practical tips
- Choose your seat wisely when drafting your arbitration agreement
Always choose a seat which has a modern arbitration law, such as in Australia, Singapore or Hong Kong, that gives tribunals all the powers they need to conduct an arbitration, have a pro-arbitration approach to enforcement and sensible judiciary.
- Consider an express agreement in your arbitration agreement
If parties want to ensure emergency arbitrator powers are available regardless of the seat, they should consider including an express clause in their arbitration agreement conferring such power. While this is unlikely to override a mandatory prohibition in the arbitration law it may assist if the arbitration law is silent.
- Know what you are agreeing to in the institutional arbitration rules
Moveon had not considered in advance the limitation of agreeing to the CIETAC Rules that provide for the arbitration to be in the Chinese language unless agreed otherwise.
- When in an arbitration, always know the limitations of the procedural law at the seat
Before applying for interim relief, verify that the law of the seat empowers arbitral tribunals or emergency arbitrators to order interim measures. If it does not (as in China), consider applying to the courts instead.
The backstory: A joint venture gone cold
The dispute arose from a joint venture between Zhejiang Crystal-Optech Co Ltd (COT), a Chinese optical components manufacturer, and Moveon Technologies Pte Ltd (Moveon), a Singapore-based polymer optics company. Apple introduced the two parties, and they had partnered to manufacture lens components under a project known as ‘Project Viserion’. They incorporated a Singapore joint venture company, Crystal-Moveon Technologies Pte Ltd (CMOT), and entered into a Cooperation Framework Agreement and a Joint Venture Agreement, both governed by Chinese law and providing for China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) arbitration.
Project Viserion was terminated by Apple in mid-2022 due to technical difficulties. Moveon sought reimbursement from CMOT for costs it had incurred allegedly on CMOT’s behalf, while COT took the view that those costs were Moveon’s own risk under the agreements. CMOT was wound up in March 2024, and Moveon secured a settlement agreement with CMOT’s liquidators, admitting Moveon’s proof of debt for approximately SGD$19.4 million. That settlement was approved by the Singapore High Court.
In July 2025, COT filed for emergency arbitrator relief at CIETAC’s Shanghai Sub-Commission, seeking an order to freeze Moveon’s dividend payout from CMOT’s liquidation pending resolution of the substantive arbitration. A CIETAC emergency arbitrator was appointed, a hearing was held (without Moveon’s participation), and an interim award was issued within two weeks, ordering Moveon to maintain the status quo and refrain from receiving any dividend payouts.
COT then sought to enforce the interim award in Singapore. Following Moveon’s challenge, Justice Jeyaretnam, President of the Singapore International Commercial Court, sitting in the Singapore High Court refused enforcement of the award.
The decisive issue: Did the emergency arbitrator have the power to act?
At the heart of the decision was a fundamental question: did the emergency arbitrator have the power to order interim measures? If the emergency arbitrator purported to exercise a power which he (in this case) did not possess then he would have exceeded his authority and the arbitral award would be outside the scope of the submission to arbitration and the Court could refuse enforcement pursuant to section 31(2)d of the IAA.[1]
First Jeyaretnam J turned to the relevant provision of the CIETAC Rules. Article 23(2) of the CIETAC Rules stated that: In accordance with the applicable law or the agreement of the parties, a party may apply to the Arbitration Court for emergency relief pursuant to the CIETAC Emergency Arbitrator Procedures (Appendix III).
Accordingly, Jeyaretnam J held that Article 23(2) applies in either of two situations: first where the application for emergency relief accords with the applicable law; and secondly where it accords with the parties’ agreement.
Whether emergency relief was applied for in accordance with the applicable law?
It was undisputed that the ‘applicable law’ included Chinese law as the law of the seat. COT argued that the ‘applicable law’ also included Singapore law (as the law of the place of enforcement). The Court rejected this.
Drawing on the New York Convention, the IAA, leading academic commentary, and the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators’ Practice Guideline on Applications for Interim Measures, unsurprisingly the Court held that the power of an arbitral tribunal or emergency arbitrator to grant interim measures is governed only by the lex arbitri – the law of the seat – not the law of the place of enforcement. The suggestion that a tribunal’s powers could vary depending on where a party intended to enforce an award was described by Jeyaretnam J as ‘unorthodox and, in my view, wrong in principle’[2] as well as being an inherently impractical proposition.
The Court then turned to the substance of Chinese law as the only applicable law. Both parties’ Chinese law experts agreed that Chinese law does not expressly prohibit arbitral tribunals or emergency arbitrators from ordering interim measures. From that point on, the two experts diverged.
Professor Fu (for Moveon) argued that under Chinese law, preservation measures (whether in relation to property, evidence, or conduct) are the exclusive preserve of the courts. The silence of Chinese law on tribunal-ordered interim relief cannot be construed as a grant of power. [A]djudicative authority… must be grounded in clear statutory authorisation’, and the absence of this renders the… Interim Award ‘void from the outset’ and invalid under China’s Arbitration Law.[3]
Mr Meng (for COT) argued the opposite: that silence equals permission, and institutional rules like the CIETAC Rules provide the necessary power for tribunals to order interim measures to take effect in foreign jurisdictions.[4]
The Court preferred Professor Fu’s approach. The Chinese Arbitration Law reserves preservation measures to the courts in China. China’s Civil Procedure Law does the same for conduct preservation. Furthermore, the legislative policy in China is against tribunal ordered interim measures. The Chinese government had expressly stated in its 2006 response to UNCITRAL Working Group II that ‘Chinese law has not accorded the arbitral tribunal the power to order preservative measures, nor the power to order interim measures’.[5]
While a 2021 draft of China’s proposed revisions to the arbitration law had included provisions empowering tribunals to grant interim measures, those provisions were ultimately not adopted, reflecting a deliberate legislative policy against tribunal-ordered interim relief.
Whether emergency relief was applied for in accordance with an agreement between the parties?
The second limb of Article 23(2) asks whether the parties agreed to empower the emergency arbitrator to order interim measures. COT argued that by agreeing to submit their disputes to CIETAC arbitration (and thereby being deemed to consent to the CIETAC Rules), this was sufficient to amount to an agreement that an emergency arbitrator can grant interim relief.
The Court rejected this submission too. Article 23(2) distinguishes between the ‘applicable law’ and the ‘agreement of the parties’, treating them as separate and alternative bases for the emergency arbitrator’s power. If mere consent to the CIETAC Rules were enough, the words ‘agreement of the parties’ in Article 23(2) would be redundant, and parties in all CIETAC arbitrations would automatically empower the emergency arbitrator to grant interim relief. Article 23(2) required that the parties agreed expressly to allow the emergency arbitrator to order interim relief.
Even then Professor Fu’s opinion doubted whether parties could expressly consent to grant an emergency arbitrator or tribunal granting interim measures for arbitrations seated in China. However, in obiter comments, Jeyaretnam J did leave the door ajar on this point: while parties cannot override a statutory prohibition in the lex arbitri on the tribunal’s powers, an express agreement by the parties (as distinct from mere deemed consent to the CIETAC Rules) might cure a situation where the lex arbitri is merely silent. This distinction was left for another future case to determine.
Other grounds?
Although the emergency arbitrator’s lack of power was determinative and led to the award being refused enforcement, the Court addressed the other grounds raised for completeness:
- Natural justice (s 31(2)(c) IAA): Moveon argued it was unable to present its case because the proceedings were conducted in Chinese on compressed timelines. The Court disagreed. Moveon had agreed to CIETAC arbitration, which defaults to the Chinese language. The tight timelines were inherent in the emergency arbitrator procedure. Moveon did not participate despite being warned of the consequences, nor did it subsequently apply to the constituted tribunal to set aside the interim award.[6]
- Arbitrability (s 31(4)(a) IAA): Moveon contended the dispute was non-arbitrable under Singapore law because it effectively challenged CMOT’s liquidation. The Court held the underlying dispute was a straightforward contractual claim between joint venture partners, pre-dating CMOT’s insolvency and accordingly arbitrable.[7]
- Public policy (s 31(4)(b) IAA): This too was rejected. None of the alleged defects in procedure met the ‘very high’ threshold required to render the award contrary to public policy under Singapore law.[8]
What does this mean for arbitration in China?
Chinese arbitral institutions have been keen to upgrade their institutional rules to provide for the modern procedural innovations seen in arbitral institutional rules issued by SIAC, HKIAC, ICC and others. China’s arbitral community is keen to show that arbitration in China can be of an international standard.
Yet this case illustrates the continuing limitations of the procedural framework for arbitration in China. China’s Revised Arbitration Law is unique to China and not based on the UNCITRAL Model Law. The Revised Arbitration Law, which came into force on 1 March 2026, modernises the previous regime, by recognising the concept of ‘seat of the arbitration’ and allowing the tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction and the validity of the arbitration agreement. Nevertheless, while the Revised Arbitration Law expands the scope of interim measures that can be ordered by the Chinese courts, the law does not confer interim measure powers on arbitral tribunals, as was central to this case, and does not allow parties in China complete autonomy to choose their arbitration forum, even in foreign-related cases, with only very limited recognition of ad hoc arbitration.
CIETAC is one of the busiest arbitral institutions in the world. Its Rules contain detailed emergency arbitrator procedures. But for China-seated arbitrations, those procedures operate in a legal environment that does not recognise tribunal-ordered interim relief, meaning emergency arbitrator awards cannot be enforced in China and, as a consequence, in Singapore and potentially other jurisdictions.
CIETAC has reacted swiftly. On 15 October 2026, CIETAC issued its own interpretation of Article 23(2) of the CIETAC Rules, stating that by agreeing to the application of the CIETAC Rules parties consent to the application of the emergency arbitrator provisions and no additional express consent was required. If parties wanted to opt out of the emergency arbitrator provisions they needed to do so expressly in writing. CIETAC noted that China’s laws did not prohibit tribunals from ordering interim relief. CIETAC also stated that ‘applicable law’ had a broad meaning and could mean other laws, not just the law where the arbitration is based. It remains to be seen how persuasive CIETAC’s interpretation is given the Singapore decision.
Institutional rules cannot create powers the law of the seat denies
China is not alone amongst Asian jurisdictions in not permitting tribunals expressly to order interim measures. Zhejiang Crystal-Optech potentially has implications for arbitrations seated in these other jurisdictions (like Indonesia) that also do not permit tribunals expressly to order interim measures.
Significantly, based on the Court’s analysis, where the law of the seat is silent on tribunal-ordered interim measures and parties have not expressly agreed to confer such power, the tribunal will not have the authority to order such measures. Further, Jeyaretnam J did not determine conclusively if the parties could confer such a power through agreement – despite his tentative conclusion that this may be possible – this was left for another time and again would depend on the law at the seat in question.
Many arbitral institutions (such as CIETAC, SIAC, ICC, HKIAC) have emergency arbitrator provisions, and their rules are drafted for global use across multiple seats. But the enforceability of emergency arbitrator awards will ultimately depend on whether the law of the seat supports the power exercised. Practitioners drafting arbitration clauses should consider whether the seat they select recognises emergency arbitrators and if there is doubt, consider including an express agreement conferring such power.
[1] Section 31 of the IAA mirrors the provisions in Article V of the New York Convention. Section 31(2)(d) embodies Article V(1)(c).
[2] At [57].
[3] At [74].
[4] At [75].
[5] At [69].
[6] At [101] – [116].
[7] At [117] – [127].
